Trust and the Governance of Higher Education: The Introduction of Chancellor System in Hungarian Higher Education by Kováts, Gergely
Trust and the Governance of Higher
Education: The Introduction
of Chancellor System in Hungarian
Higher Education
Gergely Kováts
Introduction: Researching Trust in Higher Education
Since the 1980s, most European higher education systems are in a state of
permanent reform. Governments have been launching reform initiatives one after
another in funding, governance, quality assurance, study program structure, etc.
One of the most important and undervalued factors which affect the success and
effectiveness of reform efforts is the level of trust between different actors.
The level of trust is, on the one hand, an important input factor of reform
processes because it determines how much we have conﬁdence in the other’s
competence, goodwill and reliability and how much risk we are ready to take based
on the promises made by the other party. At the same time, trust is also an output of
reform processes, as experience gained during reforms shapes the level of trust.
(Dis)trust is the result of a learning process.
The literature usually emphasizes the beneﬁts of a high level of trust. Different
theories provide different explanations. High level of trust reduces the transaction
costs of supervision and thus enhance cooperation (institutional economics),
increases the predictability of action leading to reduced complexity (system theory),
increases the ability to adapt to the changing environment (institutional sociology),
and autonomy also requires a certain level of trust (critical management). Trust has
been studied extensively in many disciplines closely related to higher education.
New Public Management (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008; Rommel and
Christiaens2009; van de Walle 2011; Bouckaert 2012) and business administration
(Hurley 2012) are notable examples. The impact of trust on higher education policy
and management has drawn less attention. Trow stated already in 1996 that in
European higher education “trust is not much discussed because its role in uni-
versity life is not recognized, or because it is not seen as directly responsible for
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policy and action either by the state or by the institution” (Trow 1996: 312).
The situation has not changed much since then, as only a handful of new publi-
cations are available currently, mostly from non-European authors. The majority of
them focuses on the governance of systems and institutions. For example, Tierney
(2006a) provides a case study in a US institution to understand the role of aca-
demics in governance. In his study, he contrasts two frameworks to study trust: a
cultural framework (built upon a social constructivist paradigm of organisations)
and the rational choice framework (based on functionalist views). Tierney argues
that “Trust and trustworthiness, then, are necessary but not sufﬁcient criteria for
effective academic governance in the twentyﬁrst century” (Tierney 2006a: 195), but
“trust also does not naturally develop in an organization simply because a leader
sees its utility. Instead, it needs to be nurtured over time” (Tierney 2006a: 194). In
another work, Tierney (2006b) provides other frameworks (“grammars”) to
understand trust. He argues that risk-taking is an essential part of being an aca-
demics. Universities can fulﬁl their social roles if their members experiment and
innovate, which requires supportive organizational cultures with a high level of
trust. Vidovich and Currie (2011) use Tierney’s concepts of trust to analyze
changing policy on governance in Australian higher education. They discuss the
dynamics of how reforms inspired by new public management, such as the more
managerial governance of institutions, can create trust and distrust. While Tierney
(2006a) focuses clearly on the institutional level, and Vidovich and Currie (2011)
focus on the policy level, in this paper I propose to combine the two approaches by
studying how top-down policies affect trust on the institutional level. The intro-
duction of the so-called chancellor system in the Hungarian higher education and its
consequences on trust and mistrust will be analysed as a case study. The main
research question is whether newly appointed chancellors (responsible for the
budget and all the administration in the institution) are trusted by their academic
peers, and how the level of trust is influenced by institutional settings and policy
measures. In the ﬁrst part, a short overview is provided about the development of
the governance system of Hungarian higher education. The second part describes
the position of chancellor and the new dual executive governance system of
Hungarian HEIs it brought about. The third part summarizes the factors that
influence the decision to trust or not to trust somebody by Hurley (2012). This
framework is applied in the analysis of the Hungarian case study in the fourth
part. The last section includes the discussion of conclusions and lessons learned.
Changing the Governance System in Hungarian Higher
Education
The European higher education has undertaken signiﬁcant changes over the last
30–40 years. They include a rocky route from elite to mass higher education
accompanied by the diversiﬁcation of institutions and programmes, increased
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competition and changing funding patterns. In post-socialist countries, all the
reforms started simultaneously after the change of regime in 1989–1990, resulting
in a highly unstable and dynamic environment. In Hungary, the pace of change and
lack of stability is highlighted by four education laws and over 100 amendments to
them in the last 30 years.
The governance of institutions also changed considerably in this period. Similar
to the Czech Republic and Poland, the Hungarian higher education system is rooted
in the Humboldtian tradition, but in the communist period, Hungary followed the
Soviet model (Rüegg and Sadlak 2011). In the 1980s, many characteristics of the
Soviet model, especially the lack of institutional autonomy were regularly ques-
tioned. Although signiﬁcant changes took place already before the change of
regime, these changes were only truly fulﬁlled after 1990 when Humboldtian
governance traditions were restored. Institutional mergers forced by the government
in 1998 reflected a new approach to government policy, focusing on somewhat
tighter control, greater accountability and a more frequent application of indirect
control mechanism (i.e., competitive student allocation system, performance con-
tracts, boards). The national elections and a change in government in 2010 became
a major turning point in higher education policy, as the new government promoted
forcefully a more centralized and direct control. The position of the Hungarian
higher education decreased in the autonomy scorecard in Europe on three dimen-
sions (organizational, funding and stafﬁng) between 2012 and 2017 (see Table 1).
One notable example was the amendment of the constitution (basic law) in 2013.
In 2005, the Constitutional Court of Hungary barred the establishment of governing
boards for public universities; a government initiative which would have resulted in
the establishment of boards included several external members and had veto power
on ﬁnancial issues. This attempt was declared as unconstitutional because it brea-
ched institutional autonomy. To avoid similar opposition, at the initiative of the
government, the Constitution (Fundamental Law) was changed in 2013, and now it
declares that “Higher education institutions shall be autonomous in terms of the
content and the methods of research and teaching; their organisation shall be reg-
ulated by an Act. The Government shall, within the framework of an Act, lay down
the rules governing the management of public higher education institutions and
Table 1 Autonomy of Hungarian higher education institutions
2010 2016
Value (%) Positiona Category Value Positiona Category
Organizational 59 16 Medium-low (3) 56 23 Medium-low (3)
Funding 71 6 Medium-high (2) 39 28 Low (4)
Stafﬁng 66 17 Medium-high (2) 50 22 Medium-low (3)
Academic 47 24 Medium-low (3) 58 16 Medium-low (3)
aThe number of evaluated countries was 28 (in 2012) and 29 (in 2017)
Source Estermann et al. (2011), and http://www.university-autonomy.eu/countries/hungary/
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shall supervise their management” (Article X paragraph 3). In 2015, a new type of
board (called consistory) was established, with veto power over HEIs strategy and
ﬁnance. It has ﬁve members four of which is appointed by the government. The
autonomy and governance of HEIs are also influenced by the introduction of a new
position, the chancellor. According to the National Higher Education Act of 2011,
chancellors represent the institutions in budgetary issues. Moreover, they are
responsible “for the economic, ﬁnancial, controlling, accounting, employment,
legal, management and IT activities of the higher education institution, the asset
management of the institution, including the matters of technology, institution
utilization, operation, logistics, service, procurement and public procurement, and
he directs its operation in this ﬁeld”. They have veto power on these issues. The
chancellor is the employer of all the university personnel, except for academic staff.
The government justiﬁed the introduction of the new governance system by
citing three arguments. First, the ﬁnancial position of HEIs weakened signiﬁcantly
after 2010, which was reflected in the increase of their debt. The State Audit Ofﬁce
and the Government Control Ofﬁce also revealed what they considered several
irregularities in Hungarian HEIs (State Audit Ofﬁce 2015). These facts were pre-
sented as signs of incompetent and incapable management. Second, the government
considered that bad management was rooted in the inadequate governance structure
of HEIs. The rector and the Senate (the main decision-making body of the insti-
tution, consisting of academic staff and students) are not competent enough, it was
said, on ﬁnancial and administrative issues. The rector’s accountability is limited
because, theoretically, it is the Senate which makes decisions and the rector only
executes them. The ﬁnancial director cannot represent effectively budgetary and
regulative interests because his/her position depends on the rector. Third, the
government as the maintainer of public HEIs should take more responsibility in
stabilizing them and enforce efﬁcient operation and compliance, similarly to the
owners of business enterprises.
There are some counterarguments, however, which the government ignored. The
deteriorating ﬁnancial position of institutions overlapped with the signiﬁcant (cc.
25–30%) reduction of state funding of HEIs (see Berács et al. 2015). For example,
the EUA public funding observatory reports that between 2010 and 2013 public
funding of higher education in Hungary decreased from 190 billion HUF to 133
billion HUF.1 Second, the government argued that institutions did not use their
autonomy to promote efﬁcient and adequate operation. It is also possible to argue,
however, that institutions were not granted enough autonomy because their gov-
ernance structure was set in stone in rigid and restrictive regulations, and rectors
were not empowered and made accountable enough so that they can enforce
ﬁnancial and academic performance. Debts and non-compliant operation can be the
result of soft budget constraints and the lack of managerial empowerment.
1http://www.eua.be/publicfundingobservatory.
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Dual Executive Leadership
The appointment of chancellors resulted in a new leadership conﬁguration where an
institution has two interdependent chief executives of equal ranks and with com-
plementary tasks. While the rector is responsible for strategy and academic issues,
the chancellor is responsible for the budget and administration.
This dual leadership conﬁguration may appear to be counterintuitive because
joint responsibility makes leaders less accountable. The mainstream management
theory argues against this idea. For example, Fayol’s principle of “unity of com-
mand” says that every employee should receive orders from only one superior or on
behalf of the superior. There are, however, several historical examples of dual
leadership conﬁgurations. In the ancient republic of Rome, there were two consuls,
and ancient Sparta had two kings. Modern times have also their own examples:
Alvarez and Svejenova (2005) identiﬁed several business enterprises led by lead-
ership couples or trios. There are other examples in the public sector as well:
theatres (Jarvinen et al. 2015), hospitals, museums (de Voogt and Hommes 2007;
Antrobus 2011), and schools (Döös 2015) can be managed by leadership couples.
So the question is not whether dual executive leadership is possible but what the
enabling conditions and critical success factor are.
In the literature, two major streams of argumentation can be found, which
explain this leadership conﬁguration. First, sharing power at the top can prevent
tyranny and reduce opportunistic behaviour if each leader checks and controls the
other’s activity. This was the reason of doubling all senior ofﬁcer positions in the
ancient republic of Rome (Sally 2002). Second, power-sharing makes organizations
capable of facing increased complexities. This is especially important when orga-
nizations face strategic uncertainty and/or internal heterogeneity (Alvarez and
Svejonova 2005; Fjellvaer 2010; O’Toole 2002).
Higher education institutions are inherently heterogeneous. As professional
bureaucracies (Mintzberg 1991), core tasks are carried out by academic staff who
are supported by a large number of administrative staff. The internal heterogeneity
(or diversity) of Hungarian HEIs increased in the 2000s. At the beginning of the
1990s, Hungary had a highly fragmented higher education system with many
specialised institutions (a heritage of the Soviet system). In 2000, several large
comprehensive institutions were created through forced mergers on a wide scale
which were followed by other waves of mergers and demergers in the 2010s. The
efforts to strengthen the authority of senior management failed, however, which
limited the possibilities to streamline institutions and standardize academic and
administrative processes. Many institutions that merged into a larger university
managed to preserve their own culture, traditions, and structure, usually as separate
faculties in the new institution. All in all, internal heterogeneity is high in larger
institutions, and it is exacerbated by the growing complexity of academic and
administrative regulations. This supports the need for dual executive leadership.
Strategic uncertainty can be deﬁned as the degree of complexity and stability of
the environment which influences the deﬁnition of goals and the goals-means
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equation (Alvarez and Svejenova 2005:51). In a complex and unstable environment
when institutions depend on several stakeholders, uncertainty is high and institu-
tions should pay attention to many different factors and interests. However, strategic
uncertainty will be lower in an environment where institutions depend mostly on
one stakeholder. The environment uncertainty has increased in the Hungarian
higher education for the last 30 years, which is clearly reflected in the frequent
change of legal regulations (See Table 2). The reinforcement of the state control
after 2011 and the increasing dependence of institutions on the government make
possible the reduction of strategic uncertainty by simply maintaining a good rela-
tionship with the government and other authorities. Therefore, introducing the dual
executive leadership conﬁguration is less convincing from this perspective. The
creation of the position of chancellors, however, can further increase the role of
government.
Decision to Trust: An Analytical Model
Miles and Watkins (2007) identiﬁed “the four pillars of effective complementarity,”
that are critical success factors of dual executive leadership. These factors are
(1) shared vision, (2) common incentives, (3) communication and (4) trust. These
factors are strongly interrelated with each other but trust is “the most crucial for a
team’s stability.” As Miles and Watkins (2007: 12) argue, “common vision, aligned
incentives, and close communication enable purposeful and powerful cooperative
action, but they have no value unless team members know that their counterparts
can and will further the best interests of the enterprise.” This is because a high level
of trust enables cooperation without using cumbersome monitoring processes. On
the other hand, low level of trust results in suspicion, caution, and reluctance to
cooperate. Hurley (2012) also emphasises the critical role of trust among leadership
team members if the task of the team is uncertain, if interdependence among
members is high, and member are specialized.
Table 2 Uncertainty of environment in the light of acts on higher education in Hungary
Act on higher
education
Number of months in
effect until the
acceptance of the new
act
Number of years in
effect until the
acceptance of the new
act
Total
number of
amendments
Amendments/
years in effect
1985–1993a 99 8.25 12 1.5
1993–2005 149 12.42 37 3.0
2005–2011 72 6.00 42 7.0
2011 68b 5.67b 43 7.6
aThis is an act of education which contains the regulation of elementary and higher education
bNumber of months/years until August 2017
Based on Polónyi (2015)
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Do academic peers trust the newly appointed chancellors? How are they per-
ceived by their academic colleagues? Hurley’s “Decision to Trust Model” provides
an excellent analytical framework to study the factors that influence the level of
trust towards particular organizational actors (Hurley 2012).
Hurley distinguishes 3 trustor factors and 7 situational factors. Trustor factors are
characteristics of those persons who make decisions whether to trust somebody else
or not. These factors are risk tolerance, adjustment, and power.
• There is a strong relationship between risk-taking and trust. “By trusting, you
make yourself vulnerable to loss” (Hurley 2012: 8). In other words, by trusting,
the trustor risks that the trustee will use the opportunity to his/her own advan-
tage. As a result, risk takers are more willing to trust while risk avoiders are less
likely to trust.
• Well-adjusted persons have high self-esteem, a realistic view of the world,
emotional stability and independence. They are more likely to trust because they
have a high level of conﬁdence. Those who are poorly adjusted see the world as
a place full of threats, which makes them more suspicious. As a result,
“low-adjustment individuals will tend to need more assurance to trust” (Hurley
2012: 47).
• Having the power to punish betrayal can decrease the risk stemming from
trusting somebody. People in authority position are more likely to trust. Those
without power, however, feel more vulnerable and, therefore, less willing to
trust (Table 3).
Situational factors are those contextual factors which influence the relationship
between parties. These factors are much easier to influence than trustor factors.
Situational factors include the followings:
• Security refers to the level of stakes in the situation. The higher the stakes are,
the more difﬁcult to gain trust is.
• “Similarities” refer to the experience that “people tend to more easily trust those
who appear similar to them” (Hurley 2012: 30).
• Alignment of interests raises the question whether the trustor has similar
interests as the trustees. If similar interests are assumed, then trusting the other
party is more likely.
• Benevolent concern: when the trustor thinks that the trustee is willing to put the
trustor’s interest above the trustee’s interest, that is, the trustee is benevolent
toward the trustor, trusting decision is more likely. The demonstration of
benevolence can increase the level of trust. If we have the perception that the
trustee always follows his/her own interest, then we are less likely to trust.
• Capability: the willingness not to break an agreement is not enough to earn trust;
the trustor should believe that the trustee is able to successfully fulﬁl his/her
part. Disbelief in the capability of trustees results in less trustful relationships.
• Predictability and integrity raise the question to what extent the trustee is reli-
able. “Integrity (honouring one’s word or practicing what one preaches)
increases predictability” (Hurley 2012: 66).
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• Communication is critical in creating trusting relationships. Hurley thinks that
all situational factors (except for situational security) are underpinned by
communication because these factors can work through communication. The
frequency and openness of communication can counterbalance the lack of other
factors while poor communication often leads to “spirals of distrust,” where
perceived betrayal further impoverish communication.
While risk tolerance and adjustment are personal traits, power, in my opinion, is
closer to situational factors because having the power to retaliate depends on the
situation. It is possible, for example, to empower the trustor and provide him/her
means to retaliate to gain his/her trust. Therefore, trust can be influenced by
manipulating power.
In Chancellors We Trust?
In this section, four factors—power, similarities, capabilities, and interests—will be
analysed to answer the research question, which is whether chancellors are trusted
by academic leaders or not. These factors are selected because of two reasons. First,
the general institutional setting (e.g., regulations, selection process) has the largest
impact on these factors while the other trustor and situational factors are
person-speciﬁc or institution-speciﬁc factors and therefore results are difﬁcult to
generalize to the whole higher education sector. Second, studying these factors is
supported by the analysis of chancellors’ CVs and data from two anonymous
surveys which were conducted in 2015 and 2016 among academic leaders of
Hungarian public institutions. Rectors, vice-rectors, deans and vice-deans were
asked about their expectations and opinions on chancellors and the chancellor
Table 3 The summary of the decision-to-trust model
Factors Distrusting
characteristic
Trusting
characteristic
Trustor factors Risk tolerance Low High
Adjustment Low High
Power Low High
Situational
factors
Situational security Low High
Similarities Few Many
Interests Conflicting Aligned
Benevolent concern Not demonstrated Demonstrated
Capability Low High
Predictability/
integrity
Low High
Communication Poor Good
Source Hurley (2012)
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system. These surveys were not created speciﬁcally to test hypotheses regarding
trust toward chancellors. Nevertheless, they can provide useful data to test, illustrate
or generate hypotheses. The response rate was around 25% in both years (see
Table 4).
The results can be considered representative for the type of institutions and the
position of respondents. On the other hand, some institutions are overrepresented
among respondents, while other (smaller) institutions have no respondents at all. As
the experience at the institutional level has a signiﬁcant impact on the opinion about
chancellors, the disproportionate distribution of respondents among institutions
might distort results. An additional important caveat is the fact that the completion
of questionnaires was voluntary, which could also distort the representativeness of
the sample because the questionnaire was more likely to be ﬁlled in by those who
are emotionally more affected by the chancellor system. Based on the respondents’
satisfaction with the chancellor and their agreement with the chancellor system,
three major groups of respondents could be identiﬁed (Table 5).2 The “absolute
supporters” are satisﬁed with the chancellor and agree with the major characteristics
of the chancellor system. The “opposers” are not satisﬁed with the chancellor and
do not agree with the chancellor system. The third group consists of respondents
who are satisﬁed with their chancellors but do not support the system itself. The
proportion of the three major groups in the 2016 surveys can be seen in the
following table.
Table 4 Response rates of two surveys conducted in 2015 and 2016
2015 2016
Number of
respondents
Size of
population
Response
rate (%)
Number of
respondents
Size of
population
Response
rate (%)
Rector, vice
rector
14 86 16.3 19 94 20.2
Dean, vice
dean
66 398 16.6 97 396 24.5
Other leader
in faculty or
central
administration
17 41 41.5 – – –
Other 13 – – 10 31 32.3
Not provided 29 – – 8 – –
Total 139 525 26.5 134 521 25.7
2The degree of satisfaction with the chancellor was measured by asking “How satisﬁed are you
with the work of the chancellor in the institution so far?” The attitude towards the chancellor
system was captured by aggregating the answers to four questions. Respondents were asked to
indicate how much they agree with the following characteristics: (1) institutions are not involved in
the selection of chancellors; (2) the rector is not the employer of the chancellor and is not allowed
to give him/her instructions; (3) administrative units have to be directed by the chancellor and
(4) the employer of all administrative staff is the chancellor.
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Power
Power refers to the trustor’s ability to retaliate if the trustee displays an oppor-
tunistic behaviour. Most higher education institutions are bottom-heavy organiza-
tions (Clark 1983). Academics require a high level of autonomy, and they wish to
control many aspects of their own work. The self-governing structure of Hungarian
HEIs provided the opportunity for academics to enforce their interests collectively.
One of the most important characteristics of the chancellor’s position is its inde-
pendence from academics. Chancellors are selected, appointed and supervised by
the government. While chancellors control the administration, they also have veto
power on all issues (including academic issues) which affect the budget. The result
is an asymmetric relationship with the academic sphere. Although chancellors are
required to cooperate with the rector by law and cooperation is necessary to make
institutions successful, neither the rector nor the Senate has the power to force the
hand of the chancellors directly. On the one hand, this makes chancellors able to
represent budgetary and administrative interests effectively. On the other hand,
academics have only indirect possibilities to influence chancellors if they perceive
that the chancellor acts against the interest of academics. For example, one of the
recurring comments in the surveys is that some chancellors use their position for
rent-seeking or to provide positions for their favoured ones, that is, they follow
opportunistic behaviours. In that case, institutions can turn only to the government,
who appoints the chancellors, for conflict resolution. This is not a very powerful
way of retaliation for academics and the Senate.
Similarities
Referring to the social identity theory, Hurley argues that “people with whom we
can “identify” or whom we see as similar to us in some fashion have an advantage
in gaining our trust” (Hurley 2012: 56). This notion is based on the assumption that
involved parties share similar values, visions, and cognitive frames.
Table 5 Satisfaction with the chancellor and agreement with the chancellor system in 2016
(N = 133)
Satisfaction with the activity of the chancellor
Supporting
(satisﬁed)
(%)
Uncertain/
no answer
(%)
Opposing
(not satisﬁed)
(%)
Total
(%)
Support for the
chancellor
system
Supporting 12.8 0.0 1.5 14.3
Uncertain/
no answer
6.8 0.0 3.0 9.8
Opposing 27.8 0.8 47.4 75.9
Total 47.4 0.8 51.9 100
660 G. Kováts
In dual leadership situations having a shared vision and shared values are
especially important because in this leadership conﬁguration leaders have to act
independently but in harmony with other leaders. Harmonizing goals, values and
visions which govern leaders is a time-consuming activity. It is possible to develop
mutual understanding while being in a position of power, but it is a quite risky
strategy. During the selection of chancellors (and rectors), the quality and quantity
of shared experience and similar socialization should be considered to increase the
chance of developing a trustful relationship between the two leaders. In Hungary,
HEIs do not have the right to participate in the selection process formally.
Chancellors were selected by the Ministry of Human Capacities, and they are
appointed by the Prime Minister.
The possibility of having a shared vision is also influenced by the demonstrated
knowledge about higher education sector. If chancellors know the sector well, they
might have a much clear conception of what makes an institution excellent. The
analysis of the C.V.s of chancellors appointed in 2014 and early 2015 showed that
only 12 chancellors out of 29 had previous experience with the sector, and 14
chancellors had not (there was no information available in the case of 3 chancel-
lors). Not knowing the culture of higher education weakens the trust towards them,
and it might affect the perception of their capability as well.
In light of these arguments, it is not surprising that chancellors who worked in
the institution before their appointment are perceived more trustworthy, and aca-
demic leaders are more satisﬁed with their performance. In Table (6), it can be seen
that academic leaders working with chancellors appointed from within higher
education are more satisﬁed (65%) than those leaders who work with chancellors
appointed from outside the sector (39%).
Table 6 The effect of selection from within institutions
Previous attachment to the institution
Yes (the chancellor
was the employee of
the institution before
his/her appointment)
(N = 48) (%)
Did not work
previously in the
institution
(N = 78) (%)
Total
(N = 126)
(%)
Satisfaction
with the
chancellor’s
activity
Fully satisﬁed 25 13 17.5
Rather satisﬁed 40 26 31.0
Rather not satisﬁed 27 23 24.6
Not satisﬁed at all 8 38 27.0
Total 100 100 100.0
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Alignment of Interests
Alignment of interests focuses on the question whether interests of the trustor and
the trustee are conflicting or not. The magnitude of the conflict of interests and the
chancellor’s demonstrated action against his/her putative self-interest (benevolence)
can influence the level of trust towards him/her. Chancellors are in an “in-between”
position because they are appointed by the government to represent governmental
interests, on one hand, but they also have to promote institutional interests to have a
successful organization, on the other. Therefore, they have to balance different
interests and mediate between the government and the institution. They have to
demonstrate loyalty towards two parties. Incentive structures are key in this situ-
ation. Chancellors have a strong relationship with the ministry. They had to report
to the ministry every month (rectors were not involved), and the ministry evaluated
their performance yearly. The evaluation criteria were not known which provided
fertile ground for gossips about the hidden agenda of chancellors. In addition, there
were complaints that rectors felt neglected. 2017 was the ﬁrst year when the rector
and the chancellor had to submit a yearly report together but institutions are still not
involved in the selection of chancellors.
The perception of chancellors can also be influenced by their previous com-
mitments. The analysis of CV’s showed that 9 out of 29 chancellors appointed until
early 2015 had strong links to the governing party: they were either members of the
parliament, a local government body, or fulﬁlled senior leadership positions in
(local) governments before their appointment.
The surveys also produced interesting results regarding how the chancellors’ role
is perceived. Respondents evaluated the desirability and the realization of different
behaviours in a 6-point-scale, where 1 means that the given behaviour is not typical
at all, and 6 means that it is very typical. Behaviours could be grouped into four
broad categories (they were shown to respondents in a mixed order):
• Institutional roles, where the chancellor represents the interest of the institution,
such as “presenting unique characteristics of the HEI to the maintainer” or
“helping the institution in the public administration.”
• Maintainer roles, where the chancellor represents the interest of the ministry
such as “informing the maintainer about on-going internal affairs” or “executing
maintainer’s decision.”
• Expert roles where chancellors represent the interest of the profession such as
“strengthening entrepreneurial approach” or “ensures compliance with
regulations.”
• Self-serving roles where chancellors represent their own interest, e.g., to enlarge
their power base.
While the desirability of roles does not differ signiﬁcantly among respondent
groups, the realization of roles is perceived differently (Fig. 1).
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Those respondents who are satisﬁed with their chancellor and support the
chancellor system in general (absolute supporters) see their chancellor to fulﬁl all
roles simultaneously, that is, chancellors are able to balance institutional, ministerial
and professional expectations successfully. Those who are not satisﬁed with the
chancellor and do not support the chancellor system (“oppose everything”) see
Fig. 1 The perception of the
realization of behaviours/roles
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chancellors differently: while they think that chancellors serve the interest of the
ministry similar to the absolute supporters, their perception of serving the interest of
the institution differs considerably. In other words, this group of respondents sees
chancellors more as an agent of the ministry (government) and less as a leader
representing and promoting the interest of the institution. This pattern is similar to
those groups of respondents who are satisﬁed with their chancellor but do not
support the chancellor system.
Capabilities
Capabilities describe to what extent chancellors are perceived as being able to
perform expected tasks successfully. In the survey, respondents were asked to
evaluate several competencies of their chancellors on a 6-point scale (1 means they
are not competent at all, while 6 means they are fully competent.) (Fig. 2).
Respondents satisﬁed with the chancellor see them more competent in almost
every aspect than those who are not satisﬁed with them. The evaluation of ‘political
network’ is remarkable. Satisﬁed respondents think that chancellors are less com-
petent in building/having political networks than in other competencies. That
suggests that chancellors act as professionals and not as political actors. Those who
are less satisﬁed think that chancellors perform somewhat better in building
political networks then in most other competencies.
Fig. 2 Perception of chancellors’ competence by different groups of respondents
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Summary and Discussions
Survey results suggest that, in general, there is a strong mistrust towards chancel-
lors. Most respondents are quite critical of the chancellor system, and half of the
respondents are not satisﬁed with the chancellor. They usually perceive chancellors
as less competent administrators who act as political agents of the government. This
picture is true in the majority of institutions. In most institutions, results are mixed
or show a high level of dissatisfaction with the chancellors. In some institutions,
however, respondents are more satisﬁed with their chancellor (who usually comes
from within), even if they are still quite critical of the chancellor system itself.
Although the decision-to-trust-model would explain this mistrust by the unfa-
vourable trustor and situational factors, the direction of casualty between the level
of trust and situational factors is not clear. Do academics mistrust chancellors
because they perceive them as incompetent (as the decision-to-trust-model sug-
gests)? Alternatively, do academics see them incompetent because they mistrust
them? The problem is that it is not only the trustor or the trustee who controls the
situation but this is also shaped by external actors whose (previous) activities can
create hopes, fears, and expectations which affect how the trustee is perceived. For
example, it is interesting to see how strong the relationship is between the satis-
faction with the chancellor/chancellor system and the perception of the trustfulness
of government ofﬁcials (Table 7).
Even a competent, benevolent and reliable chancellor will face mistrust at the
beginning of his/her career if academic leaders had become suspicious previously.
Chancellors have to overcome this legitimacy deﬁcit by working consciously on
improving situational factors. They should demonstrate predictability, integrity,
benevolence, and competence by, for example, having a very transparent decision-
making process in which key academic partners are involved, their opinion is
Table 7 The relationship between trust in government and satisfaction with the chancellor/
chancellor system
To what extent do you trust the promises and
statements of the leaders of the Ministry of Human
Capacities?
No or
rather
no (%)
Undecided
(%)
Yes or
rather
yes
(%)
No
answer
(%)
Total
(%)
Satisfaction with the
chancellor and the
chancellor system
Absolute support 24 6 65 6 100
Opposing
everything
86 5 10 100
Supporting the
chancellor,
opposing the
system
43 14 41 3 100
Total 60 7 31 2 100
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considered. It is not just the result of the decision what matters but also the fairness
and transparency of the process. Developing a personal connection with the rector
(and with other academic leaders) helps the development of shared visions. For
example, sharing rooms and/or having a shared secretary with the rector is a
possible way to increase the richness and frequency of informal conversations.
There are other possibilities to increase trust toward chancellors. By involving
institutions in the selection of chancellors, HEIs have more means to balance
asymmetric power relationships and to retaliate opportunistic behaviour. It also
helps to select candidates who share values, vision with the rector (similarity). This
creates better conditions for a good working relationship between the two execu-
tives which is crucial for the performance of institutions. In Germany, for example,
where the chancellor position also exists, although it is differently deﬁned, all major
stakeholders are involved in the selection of chancellors (Table 8).
An alternative (but less favourable) strategy to involvement is to make the
selection process more transparent to institutions. In that case, creating low-risk
mechanisms for institutions to voice their concerns regarding the activity of the
chancellor (e.g., regular meeting with rectors, etc.) is also important to counter-
balance asymmetrical power relations. To earn academics’ trust, chancellors should
be positioned as autonomous experts who are part of the institutional management
team rather than government controlled agents. This is what happened in Germany.
As Blümel observed: “In contrast to the formerly widespread model of monocratic
leadership, in which the formal status of the Kanzler was characterized by a
somewhat ambivalent position working aside the rector, the leadership-team model
now compulsory prescribes the administrative head as member of the
university-leadership team” (Blümel 2016: 11). As a result, the chancellor “for-
merly mediating between the university and the state (…) was subsequently
transformed into a functional member within an expanded university leadership.”
(Blümel 2016: 18) All processes which focus exclusively on chancellors increase
suspicion towards them because it put emphasis on persons rather than teams. The
lesson is that even if an issue clearly belongs to the competence of the chancellor,
the institution should be addressed and not the chancellor. The chancellors should
not report to the ministry alone but together with the rector (or with the consent of
the rector) as they are both responsible for the performance of the institution. If
chancellors are evaluated alone (apart from the rector), the evaluation criteria
should be transparent to all parties.
Trust also depends on perceived competencies and the knowledge of the higher
education industry. In Hungary, there are in-house trainings exclusively for chan-
cellors, but training academic leaders and chancellors together would be a great
opportunity to help the development of shared visions and values and to strengthen
communication between them.
Finally, the chancellor system was introduced in Hungary when institutions were
under huge ﬁnancial pressures decreasing their situational security. That factor can
be improved by more generous funding of institutions, which in turn would reduce
resource allocation conflicts.
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Table 8 Stakeholders’ involvement in the selection of chancellors in Germany and in Hungary
State Recommend Elect, Conﬁrm,
Consent
Appoint Employer
Baden-Württenberg Special committee
narrows a list with
the consent of the
minister
Rector recommends
among them
Board + Senate
choose together from
the narrowed list
Not
known
Minister
(can
delegate
the right)
Bavaria Board – Rector
(State
conﬁrms)
Rector
Berlin Special committee
(Curatorium,
dominated by the
State)
– State State
Brandenburg – – Rector Rector
Bremen, Hesse Rector Senate Rector Rector
Hamburg Rector Board State State
Lower Saxony Rector (Board
express opinion)
Senate State State
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Rector Committee (Konzil)
consisting of
university citizens
State State
North Rhine-Westphalia – The united committee
of the Senate and the
Board with the consent
of the rector
State State
Rhineland-Palatinate Board – Rector
(State
conﬁrms)
Minister
(can
delegate
the right)
Saarland Rector Senate State State
Saxony Rector (Senate
express opinion)
Board consent is
required
State State
Saxony-Anhalt Senate – State Minister
(can
delegate
to the
rector)
Schleswig-Holstein Rector (at least two
persons)
Senate State State
Thuringia Rector Senate (with the
consent of the
minister)
Board Rector
Hungary – State State
(prime
minister)
Minister
Source based on the Higher Education Laws of German states as of 2015. The compilation is made by
Péter Nagy
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